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Interest Rates and Economic Activity
ABSTRACT
There is widespread feeling that current deficits, in Europe and the U.S.,
may hurt rather than help the recovery. This paper examines some of the issues
involved, through a sequence of three models.
The first model focuses on sustainability and characterizes its
determinants. It suggests that the issue of sustainability may indeed be
relevant in some countries.
The second model focuses on the effects of fiscal policy on real interest
rates, and in particular on the relative importance of the level of deficits and
the level of debt in determining interest rates.
The third model focuses on the effects of fiscal policy on the speed of the
recovery. It shows how a sharply increasing fiscal expansion might be initially





Cambridge, MA 02139The size of fiscal deficits is becoming a major source of concern.
In Europe and Japan, the large current deficits are inhibiting the use
of further, even temporary, fiscal expansion; indeed at the bottom of a
recession, most governments are attempting to reduce spending and increase
tax revenues. In the United States on the other hand, where current
deficits are large and anticipated deficits much larger, there is wide-
spread concern that they may slow or even prevent a complete recovery.
The perception that deficits may hurt rather than help the recovery
is clearly at odds with the traditional view that deficits, although they
will in general increase interest rates, will nevertheless increase demand
and economic activity. Although no unified or well articulated "new
view" has emerged, challengers of the traditional view insist on the
abnormally large size of current deficits. Such deficits, they argue,
may be simply unsustainable, a possibility never considered by the
traditional view. They may be so large and so prolonged that the increase
in real interest rates may more than offset their direct expansionary
effect. The purpose of this paper is to see whether this new view has
some validity, and more generally to reexamine the relation between debt,
deficits, interest rates and economic activity.
The first issue taken up in the paper is that of sustainability.
Is it the case that some countries are running unsustainable deficits
and may be forced, at some time in the future, to repudiate the debt
either explicitly or through inflation depreciation? If this was the
case, the increased uncertainty generated by deficits might well offset
their expansionary effect. The purpose of the first model is thus to
clarify the notion of sustainability and to think about its determinants.
A casual examination of the evidence suggests that sustalnability may—2—
indeed have become a relevant issue in some European countries.
The second issue taken up is that of the relation between real
rates, debt and deficits.. Even if deficits are sustainable, they will
affect interest rates. Do interest rates, however, depend on the level of
debt, or on the level of deficits or on both? These are the questions
addressed in the second model of the paper. Central to this set of issues
is the question of the horizon of agents, as we know that if agents have
infinite horizons, interest rates may depend neither on debt nor on deficits.
The main element of the model is thus the derivation of an aggregate
consumption function which does not satisfy Ricardo—Barro equivalence.
The model shows that long real rates depend on the anticipated sequence
of debt, or equivalently on the current level of debt and the anticipated
sequence of deficits.
The third and last issue is that of potentially perverse effects
of deficits on output. Can deficits increase real rates by so much as
to decrease aggregate demand and output? The third model builds on the
previous one but allows for an effect of aggregate demand on output.
Its main conclusion is that, although current deficits are expansionary,
the anticipation of growing deficits may well reduce economic activity.
This suggests that the fiscal program of the current U.S. administration
could, be currently contractionary rather than expansionary.
The paper has four sections. Section I presents briefly the basic
facts about debt, current and anticipated deficits and spending levels.
Section II focuses on sustainability. Sections III and IV characterize
the relation between debt, deficits, interest rates and output.—3
Section I. Basic Statistics
The relevant basic statistics are presented for the U.S. and eight
EEC countries in Table 1.
Focusing first on debt, we find that the average ratio of debt to
GOP is relatively low by historical standards. There are, however, wide
variations of this ratio across countries, from 16% in Denmark to 98% in
Ireland. (These inter—country variations are no wider than intra—country
variations over time: the ratio fell in the U.S. from 100% in 1947 to
25% in the mid 70's).
Turning to deficits, we see that they are large by historical
standards; this is true for both 1982 and projected 1983 deficits and
still holds after inflation correction of nominal interest payments on
government debt, as shown in Column 4. Column 5 shows, however, that
with some exceptions, the current deficits are largely cyclical: if
there was no change in fiscal policy, they would disappear as the world
economy returned to full employment. As return to full employment is still
far in the future, these full employment surpluses would still correspond
to actual deficits until at least the mid 80's.
Most countries, therefore, do not currently have structural deficits.
There is, however, evidence in the U.S. of looming structural deficits
starting in 1983 and, in the absence of further changes in fiscal policy,
averaging 6% of GNP for the rest of the decade.' Two of the proximate
causes, the income tax cuts voted in 1981 and the increase in defense
spending are clearly specific to the U.S. The third, the increase in
real interest rates, is common to all countries, affecting them in proportion
to their debt to GOP ratios. The stance of discretionary fiscal policy is
quite different outside of the U.S.: cyclically adjusted budget deficits—4—
Table 1. Debt, deficits and spending
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1981 1982 1983 1982 1982 1982 1982
(end)
Debt SurplusSurplus SurplusSurplus Receipts Disbursements





Belgium 88 —12.8 —12.1 —5.8 —2.0 47.2 59.9
Denmark 16 —9.5 —9.6 —9.0 —6.3 51.5 60.9
Germany 35 —3.9 —4.1 —3.1 —.1 4.6 49.5
France 17 —3.0 —3.0 —1.9 +1.6 48.1 51.2
Ireland 98 —14.7 —14.4 —3.2 —.1 44.1 58.8
Italy 64 —11.6 —11.0 —1.1 +1.5 40.7 52.3
Netherlands 47 —5.7 —5.5 —2.5 +3.5 54.8 60.5
United Kingdom58 —.9 —.5 +2.4 +6.5 44.7 45.6
EEC total 42 —5.0 —4.9 —1.5 1.8 45.8 50.8
U.S. 29 —3.9 —6.5 —.3 3.7 32.1 36.0
Columns 1 to 3EEC : Source EEC, Annual Economic Report, Tables 6.1, 6.4.
U.S.: Source Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal year 1984.
Columns 4, 5 EEC : Calculations by author.
U.S.: Source OECD, WP3, 1983.
Columns 6, 7 EEC : Source EEC Annual Economic Report, Table 6.1.
U.S.: Source Economic Report of the President, 1983—5—
have been and are expected to be reduced by .5% in 1981, .8% in 1982 and
1.2% in 1983 in Japan, by .9% in 1981, 1.4% in 1982 and 1.2% in 1982 for
the EEC as a whole.2
Finally, although the focus of the paper is on deficits, that is
on decreases in taxes given spending, it is important to remember what
has happened to government spending. Except in the U.S., the level of
spending has steadily gone up over time. The ratio of government outlays
to GDP for the EEC as a who1 has increased by 10% since 1970, by 15%
since 1960. Columns 6 and 7 show how high the levels are. It is not
unlikely that some of the problems attributed to deficits come in fact
from the levels of government spending and that some arguments against
deficits are really arguments against the level of spending.—6—
Section II. Sustainability of Deficits
What does it mean to say that a given combination of debt and deficits
is unsustainable? To answer that, we can start with the government budget
constraint:
D =rD+ G -T
D is government debt and the deficit is assumed to be entirely debt
financed. r is the real interest rate, G and T spending and taxes respectively.
Let's further define T as the maximum amount of taxes which can be collected
by the government and G the minimum socially acceptable amount of government
outlays. Both, and expecially the second one, are admittedly fuzzy and would
be difficult to determine empirically. Consider the level of debt D =r1(T—C):
if debt ever exceeds D, the level of debt will be forever increasing. The govern-
ment will be in effect running a Ponzl scheme and will ultimately have to re-
pudiate its debt. The Implication is that the government cannot sell debt
beyond D, which is therefore the maximum sustainable level of debt.3 If for
example T —Cis equal to 10% of the GNP and r to 5%, D is 2 times GNP. This
shows why the issue of sustainability has arisen in parallel with increases in
real interest rates. Sustainable levels of debt are very large at the histori-
cal level of real rates of 1 —2%,much smaller at the current 3 —6%.
This computation is too simple for many reasons. It is too pessimistic
in that it does not take into account GNP growth which increases the sustainable
ratio of debt to GNI and does not allow for possible monetization and the use
of the inflation tax.4 It is also too optimistic for at least two reasons:—7—
The first is that, unless Ricardo—Barro equivalence holds, r itself is likely
to be an increasing function of the level of debt. The second is that increases
in the tax burden or decreases in spending can only happen gradually. It is
this element which is currently used to argue against a temporary fiscal ex-
pansion; many doubt that the new spending programs can indeed be only tempo-
rary. It is this last argument that we now formalize. Let:
(1) £=rD—X ; X T—G
(2) X.￿.cz(X-X) ,XET-G>O
X is the budget surplus (deficit if negative) before interest pay-
ments. Equation (2) says that the gap between X, the maximum surplus, and X
can only be reduced at ratect.5 We now want to know whether a given pair(X0, D0)
(or equivalently (D0, D0)) is sustainable or not. We can draw the phase dia-
gram of the system, with the inequality in (2) replaced by an equality. This
is done in Figure 1. The equilibrium is a saddle point, with stable arm AA.
Consider point C. Point C Is not sustainable as, even if the deficit is re-
duced as fast as feasible, i.e. if (2) holds with equality, the maximum level
of debt D is reached before deficits are eliminated. Point B on the other hand
is sustainable as deficits can be eliminated before D reaches D. BF represents
the fastest feasible path of reduction of deficits. When. p is reached, X needs
not be increased further and (2) holds as an inequality.
The critical locus is therefore the locus AE. Pairs (X, D) below it
are not sustainable and pairs above it are. It is givenby:6










CThe sustainability condition for a given (X0, D0) is therefore:
(3) (r +a)(D0 —D)—
(X0
—X)1 0
If a =, sothat there are no restrictions on changes in X, the condi-
tion is again that D0 be less than D. If a0, the condition reduces to
.0:there cannot be a positive deficit.
Equation (3) shows the role of the speed of adjustment a, the interest
rate, the level of debt, the actual deficit and the maximum potential surplus.
Returning to Table 1, Belgium with its large debt, deficits and level of spend-
ing seems to be the country most likely to violate (3). We can attempt some
crude computations. Using the implied values from Table 1 for D, X together
with r =5%and a20% implies that X be at least equal to 7.5% for the ine-
quality (3) to be satisfied. At the current level of spending, this would imply
a ratio of receipts to GDP of close to 60%, which appears very high.8 Thus sus—
tainability might indeed be an issue in Belgium; it appears to be less so in
other countries.
The model does not tell us what happens when a current fiscal
program appears unsustainable. It is likely that a program does not
suddenly become unsustainable but rather that agents start taking the
possibility of repudiation into account. What happens depends on the
type of repudiation that agents anticipate. If they anticipate attempts
to depreciate the debt through inflation at some point In the future, they
will require higher nominal interest rates on new issues of public and
private bonds. Only if public debt is of sufficiently long maturity can
the government successfully use inflation to repudiate part of the debt.
If agents anticipate repudiation of government debt only —aless likely—10—
case —theywill require a higher real rate on government debt than on
private debt so as to be compensated for the risk of repudiation. In both
cases, a shift in demand towards short maturity debt is likely.—11—
Section III. Interest Rates, Debt and Deficits at Full Employment
This section focuses on the effects of debt and deficits on the
equilibrium sequence of interest rates in a full employment economy.
This is needed to understand their effects in an economy which may not
be at full employment; it is also of more than academic interest as some of
the larger anticipated U.S. deficits are expected to take place in an
economy which should be by then at full employment.
The first step is to construct a consumption function consistent with
non neutrality of debt; the second is to close the model to derive equilibrium
interest rates.
Aggregate consumption
Aggregate consumption functions derived from individual life cycle
behavior are usually intractable, for individuals differ in two respects,
making exact aggregation difficult: they have different horizons and thus
different propensities to consume out of wealth, as well as different levels
of wealth. There is however one set of assumptions (and I believe only one)
which preserves the assumption of finite horizons, essential to the analysis
of debt and deficits but leads to a tractable aggregate consumption function;
we now explore it.
Time is continuous. At any instant, a new cohort, composed of many
agents, is born, its size normalized to be unity. Agents face, during their
lifetime, a constant instantaneous probability of death p, so that their ex-
pected life is p. Because of the large number of agents in each cohort, the
probability p is also the percentage of agents in each cohort which die at any
instant. The size of a cohort born at time zero as of time t is therefore
ePt and the size of thepopulation at any time t is et_5)ds p.—12—
The main implication of this set of assumptions is that,althoughagents are
of different ages, they all have at any time the same expected remaining life,
and thus the same marginal propensity to consume out of wealth.
Two additional assumptions, about income distribution andfinancial
markets, considerably simplify the analysis. The first is that all agents
alive work and thus share labor income equally.9 The second is that agents
can save or dissave by buying or selling actuarial bonds rather than regular
bonds, i.e. bonds which are cancelled by death. Because of the large number
of agents, intermediation between lenders and borrowers can be done risklessly.
Lenders lend to intermediaries; these claims are cancelled by death of the
lenders. Borrowers borrow from intermediaries; these claims are cancelled by
death of the borrower. If the rate of interest on regular bonds is r then ar-
bitrage and the zero profit condition in intermediation imply a rate of inter-
est on actuarial bonds of (r + p). As by assumption agents have no bequest
motive, they prefer to borrow and save only through these actuarial bonds. As
a result, they leave no bequest (this clever device was introduced by Yaari
[l965])."
-
Theaggregate consumption can nowbederived intuitively as follows:
(A derivation is given in the appendix.) Assume each agent is an expected
utility maximizer, with instantaneous logarithmic utility and subjective dis-
count rate 0. Then, denoting individual variables by lower case letters, his
consumption is characterized by: ((r +p)dv
(4). c =(p+ 0)(w + h) ;b =y5
e• da
(5) w (r+p)w+y—c
c is consumption, y is non interest income, w and h are non human and
human wealth respectively. The presence of uncertainty about death modifies
the standard formulation in two ways: The relevant interest rate is (r + p)—13—
rather than r; at the same timethemarginal propensity to consume out of wealth
is (p + 8) rather than 8.
Aggregate consumption is obtained by aggregating (4) and (5) over all
agents alive at time t. Denoting aggregate variables by upper case letters,
this gives:
S (6) C =(p+0) (W + H) ; H = Ye ds
(7) =rW+Y—C
Those two equations are similar to the individual equations with one —
major—difference.Whereas the rate of interest used to discount non interest
income is (r + p), aggregate non human wealth accumulates at rate r, not (r + p).
This is because, although the interest on actuarial bonds is (r + p)W, a por-
tion, pW, is extinguished with the death of wealth holders. Thus, the
discount rate for aggregate human wealth (r+p) is higher than the discount
rate for aggregate non—human wealth (r). The simple form of the result is
due to the existence of actuarial bonds. The qualitative nature of the
result, namely the use of a higher discount rate for humanthanfor non-
human wealth does not depend on the existence of actuarial bonds but on the
positive probability of death faced by agents. It is this difference in
discount rates which implies non—neutrality of debt and deficits.
Debt and Interest rates in steady state
Letus introduce now a government which collects lump sum taxes T on
non interest income,spendsG on goods and has debt outstanding InamountD.
Debt isinthe form of actuarial bonds, so that the budget constraint is:
(8) D=(r+p)D+G—T—pD-rD+G—T—14—
The term —pD again represents the portion of the debt which is ex—
tinguished with the death of debt holders. To see why deficits matter, we
can integrate equation (8) forward, subject to the condition that debt reaches
some steady state level:
—rdv
—5 rdv
(9) Dt + G e ds = Te ds
From equation (6), now that non interest income net of taxesisgiven
by Y —T,human wealth is given by
_c(r+P)dv _5(rv+Pdv
(10) = Y e ds —
T5e ds
In the absence of changes in government spending, changes in taxes must
leave the right hand side of (9) unehanged. This will however change the value
of the second term in (10). In effect the government "discounts" taxes at r,
agents at r + p. Current deficits, that is lower taxes today and higher taxes
later, will, unless p =0,increase and C at given interest rates.
To close the model, we simply assume that the economy is an exchange
economy, with exogenous output Y. Thus in equilibrium, private non human





Equation (11) is the condition for equilibrium in the goods market.
Equations (12) and (13) give the dynamic behavior of debt and of human wealth;
(13) follows from time differentiation of (10)
In steady state, 15= H=0and this, with some manipulation, implies:
(14) rD G—T
(15) r =0+ (p +0)p(D/(Y —G)).
Equation (14) is the steady state government budget constraint.
Equation (15) characterizes the steady state interest rate (on regular bonds).
If p =0,then the interest rate equals the subjective discount rate
and is independent of debt and spending. If p is positive however, the interest
rate is an increasing function of both debt and spending; the larger p —the
shorter the expected life —thestronger the effect. In order to induce agents
to hold the debt, the government must make agents save more; it does so by in-
creasing the interest rate over the subjective discount rate. The formula sug-
gests relatively small effects of debt on interest rates. For example if
we take reasonable upper bounds, say D/Y =1,G =.5Y,0 10% and p =5%,
r —0is equal to 1.5%. The strength of this model is, however, not in its
quantitative answers and these numbers should be looked at with caution.12
Dynamic effects of deficits
Starting from steady state and keeping government spending constant, we
now consider changes in the sequence of taxes which satisfy the intertemporal
government budget constraint. From goods market equilibrium, given output and—16—
government spending, interest rates must be such as to leave consumption and
thus the sum of debt and humanwealthconstant. If D + H constant, D —H
andfrom(12), (13):
rD+(r+p)HY—C.
Combining this with (11) gives:
(16) r =0+ p(p+ 0) (D/(Y —G)).
Thus the relation between interest rates, debt and government spending
holds at any point of timeand notonly in steady state. The short—term
interest ratedepends on the current level of debt and does not depend on
thecurrent level of deficits: a decrease in taxes, given spending has. no
effect on r. Deficits will, however, affect anticipated future real rates.
To illustrate the effects of deficits on the wholetermstructure,consider
nowthe sequence of deficits implied by:
(17) D=rD+G—T(D,x) ;TD>O T>O
Taxes are now a function of a shift parameter x and an increasing func-
tionof debt. We want to consider only sustainable deficits and thus impose:
dD/dD =Ddr/dD + r —
TD
=2r—8— TD <0
Thisrequires thattaxes increase sufficiently fast as debt increases
thus closing the deficit. Let's further define the long term interest rate as
the yield on consols paying a constant coupon flow of unity.LetR be their
yield andthus hR be their price. The instantaneous rate ofreturn on console
is
(1 +d/dt(h/R))/(h/R)= R—R/R—17—
It is the sum of the yield and of the expected capital gain, which is
negative if yields increase, or equivalently, if prices decrease. By arbitrage
between short and long bonds:
(18) R—R/Rr
We may now consider the system composed of (16), (17), (18) which
determines the dynamic behavior of debt, short and long rates.13 Eliminating
r using (16) gives a system in debt and the long rate:
15= (O+p(p+O)y'G) D+G—T(D, x)
R/R (R_O_p(p+e)_).
Thissystem has a saddle point equilibrium. Its local dynamics around
equilibrium are characterized in Figure 2. The stable arm Altisupward sloping.
A decrease in x, i.e. a decrease in taxes at any level of debt, shifts
the D =0locus to the right. The dynamics of adjustment to an unanticipated
permanent decrease in x are characterized in Figure 3. Starting from point E,
R jumps to point C,and R and D move over time along CE. The economic inter-
pretation is straightforward: A decrease in x decreases taxes, creating a
deficit. This deficit increases debt over time and thus short term rates. As
debt increases, taxes increase reducing the size of the deficit. In the new
steady state, debt and interest rates are higher. The initial deficits twist
the term structure as short term rates do not move but long rates move In anti-
cipation of higher short rates later. The term structure flattens over time,
until R and r are again equal in the new steady state.—18-.

















The effects of anticipated deficits can also be characterized using
Figure 3. A decrease in x, anticipated at t to take place at time t leads
to a jump from E to B at t, a movement from B to C from t to t and a movement
along CE' after t. Although the short term rate does not move until t, the
long rate increases at time t to cancel the effects of anticipated lower taxes
on human wealth.
To summarize, short rates depend In this full employment exchange economy
on the current level of debt. Thus long rates depend on the sequence of anti-
cipated debt, or equivalently, on the initial level of debt and the anticipated
sequence of deficits. A sequence of higher deficits will initially increase
long rates over short rates, leading over time to higher short and long rates.
This analysis suggests that the current focus on deficits rather than on
debt is possibly misdirected. It is true that the anticipated sequence
of U.S. deficits is exceptional in peacetime and implies a large increase
in the level of debt. The current level of debt as well as the anticipated
levels of debt for the medium run are still much lower than at many times
in the past.—20—
Section IV. Deficits, Interest Rates and Output
The focus is now on the potentially perverse effect of deficits on
aggregate demand and on output. The strategy has been to remain close to the
traditional Phillips curve augmented ISLM, extending it only to introduce the
distinction between short and long rates.14'
15The model is the following:
IS: Y=Y(R,g) ; Yg>O
LM : i=L(Y,m/p) L>0 ; Lm/P<O
(19): r*=i_*/p
(20): R*/R=R_r*
PC : j,*/p/p=e(Y)ey>o ;VIe()0
Aggregatedemand is assumed to depend on the long term rate, current
income and an index of fiscal expansion g. Behind this specification is one
important assumption and a technical short cut. The important assumption is
that, although financial markets look forward, agents themselves do not; there
is no direct effect of future income or future taxes on current aggregate de-
mand (there will be an indirect effect through long real rates). We shall re-
turn to this assumption later. The short cut is that fiscal policy is summa-
rized by a single index g. We know from the previous section that aggregate
demand depends on each of the components of fiscal policy, taxes, spending
and debt. Thus a permanent increase in g may correspondto a balanced budget
increase in spending or, more interestingly, to initially higher deficits which
resorb themselves as debt accumulates to reach a new higher steady state.16—21—
The LM relation determines the short term nominal rate as a function of
income and real money balances rn/p. The next two equations provide the links
between this short term nominal rate and the long real rate which appears in
the IS.(19) defines the short real rate; stars denote expectations. (20),
which was derived previously, relates short and long real rates. The last
equation is a PhillIps curves relating inflation to the level of output.
The long run equilibrium of this model is similar to that of the pre-
vious section:
If
V0(Y)=0; r,V = Y(,) ,=
pfr=L(Y,m/)
Fiscal expansion has no long run effect on output but increases the
steady state rate of interest. Prices adjust so that real money balances
are consistent with the new rate of interest.
To characterize the dynamics of output and interest rates to a fiscal
stimulus, we can reduce the system to a system in R arid p. Replacing the IS,
the LN and the Phillips curve in the interest rate equatIons(19) and (20):
(21) R*/R =(R—r)where ris given by:
r =L(Y(R,g), m/p) —e(y(R,g))
The effect of output on the short term rate is a priori ambiguous: an
increase in output increases both the short term nominal rate and expected inflation.
We shall assume that the nominal rate effect dominates, i.e. that L —> 0—22—
so that an increase in output increases the short real rate.17 In this case,
fiscal expansion increases short real rates; an increase in the long real rate
decreases output and decreases short real rates. Finally an increase in
prices decreases real money balances, increasing the short real rate.
The other relation follows from the IS and the Phillips curve:
(22) /p =O(Y(R,g))
Fiscal expansion increases output and inflation, while an increase in
long real rates decreases output and inflation.
The analysis can again be carried out most easily with a phase diagram.
The system has a saddle point equilibrium so that given p, there is a unique
value of R consistent with convergence to steady state. The local dynamics
around equilibrium are characterized In Figure 4. The stable arm AA is upward
sloping.
The dynamic effects of a fiscal expansion, that is, of an increase
in g are characterized in Figure 5. We first characterize the dynamics
technically: The system jumps from E to C and converges to E' over time.
From the Phillips Curve, asIs positive, output initially increases. From
the IS, as R increases along CE', output decreases along CE'. Finally, from
the arbitrage equation, asis positive, R is larger than r along CE'. Thus a
fiscal expansion leads initially to an increase in short real rates and out-
put; over time, output goes back to normal and short real rates increase fur-
ther. It is this increasing sequence of short rates which explains the initial
jump in long rates. Fiscal expansion therefore twists the term structure, in-
creasing long rates over short rates. This leads to more crowding out than—23--
would be predicted by models which do not distinguish between short and long
rates. It does not, however, lead to perverse effects of a fiscal expansion
on output.
Consider however a more realistic experiment, in which deficits in-
stead of being suddenly larger, increase slowly through time. Instead of a
jump of g from g to g as before, consider instead the following fiscal expan-
sion: until time t, g is equal to, and expected to remain equal to g. At t,
anticipations change and the new actual and anticipated path of g is:
g='Y(g—g)
Such a path for g corresponds for example to deficits which initially grow
over time before resorbing themselves as debt accumulates to a new, higher,
steady state level. The path of adjustment is characterized in Figure 6.
R jumps from E to C; R and p then adjust along CDE' over time. The behavior
of R, r and Y is given below the phase diagram; whether r further decreases
after its initial decrease is ambiguous)8
Thus this type of fiscal expansion has temporarily perverse effects
on output. The reason is simple. The initial current fiscal stimulus is
small. It is, however, anticipated to be large and thus to lead to high short
real rates later. As a result, long real rates increase, leading to a
decrease In aggregate demand which more than offsets the fiscal expansion,
at least initially. Thus, the model tells us, the U.S. fiscal program and its
growing projected deficits could well be initially contractionary. The model
also suggests a way in which fiscal policy could be improved. As current
deficits are expansionary and anticipated deficits contractionary, shifting
of government spending towards the present would,by increasing current deficits
and decreasing future deficits, increase aggregate demand and help the recovery.-24—
Figure 4. Dynamicsofinterest rates andprices















Figure 6. Effects of an anticipated fiscal expansion
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It is, however, time to return to the specification of aggregate demand.
What if agents are forward looking and take into account the anticipated se-
quence of taxes and income, as in the previous section? First, if they take
into account the anticipated sequence of taxes, a slow increase in deficits
is not equivalent to a slow effect of fiscal expansion on aggregate demand, to
a slow increase in g: agents will realize that the present value of their tax
burden has decreased and this will increase aggregate demand even if current
deficits are still small. Second, if they take into account future income,
the anticipation of temporarily higher output and income may also increase
aggregate demand initially)9 This effect will be stronger, the smaller the
effect of liquidity constraints, the larger the effect of fiscal expansion on
output——if for example the economy is expected to have substantial unemployed
resources for many years to come. Whether these effects more than offset the
interest rate effects is theoretically ambiguous. If these income effects
dominate, the large U.S. anticipated deficits are expansionary in spite of
their effect on current long term real rates.—27—
Conclusion
Whatdowe make then of the new view that fiscal deficits hurt rather
than help the recovery? We have found that the Issue of sustainability has
indeed, because of the increase in real rates, become a relevant issue although
probably not yet a pressing one. We have found that in turn, at full employ-
ment, short real rates increase with the level of debt; as a result, prolonged
deficits lead to increasing real rates, thus to long rates being higher than
short rates. We have finally found that, if output responds to aggregate de-
mand, anticipations of growing deficits may be initially contractionary.
The three models presented in this paper are simple enough that they
can withstand added complexity and realism without loosing analytical tacta—
bility. In particular integrating the first and the second, and the second
and third, would probably be quite useful.
Finally, this paper has focused on the effects of deficits in closed
economies. One major issue is, however, that deficits are anticipated to be
much larger in the U.S. than in the other countries. This would lead in
closed economies to large differences in real rates. It is likely to lead, in
open economies with capital mobility, to large movements in exchange rates.
believe that a two—country extension of the second model will prove useful to
analyze this issue.—28—
Appendix. Derivation of the Aggregate Consumption Function
Individual consumption
Denote by c(t, s), y(t, s), w(t, s), h(t, s) consumption, non interest
income, non human wealth and human wealth of an agent born at time t,asof
time s.
At time s, the agent maximizes:
E( log c(t, v)
—
v)OdV.
Under the assumption of a constant instantaneous probability of death p, and
of subjective certainty about c(t, v), vt, this is equivalent to
(Al) max log c(t, v) e
—v)(e+
The "budget constraint" faced by the agent at time s is, if the rate on actuarial
notes is r(ji) ÷pat time p: (the discussion and justification of the implicit
transversality condition is given in Yaari [1965, p. 1461)
'V
—!(r(.i)+ p)dp —I (r(ii)+ P)dii
(A2) c(t,v) e1 dv =w(t,a) +5(tv)e dv
S
The solution to this maximization problem is:
V
—(r(u)+ p)di.i
(A3) c(t, a)(p + O)(w(t, s) + (y(t,v)e dv)
(A4) dw(t, s)/ds =(r(s)+ p)w(t, a) + y(t, a) —c(t,a)-29—
Aggregate consumption
Denote aggregate consumption, aggregate non interest income, aggregate






(A5)C(s) =(0+ p)[W(s) +e(t
-
S)P(Y(t, v) e dv)dt]
where.
W(s) = w(t,s) e(t
—
Under the assumption that non interest income is the same for all
agents alive, y(t, v)pY(v) V t and all agents alive have the same human
wealth. Thus (A5) can be rewritten as:






Differentiating W(s) with respect to time gives:
8d (t s) e(t5)1) dW(s)/ds =w(s,s) —pW(s)+ dt
Using (A4) and w(s, s)0 gives:
(A7) dW(s)/ds =r(s)W(s)+ Y(s) —C(s)—30—
Equations (A3) and (A4) are equatior(4) and (5) in the text,equations
(A6) and (A7) are equations (6) and (7) in the text.—31—
Footnotes
1. Budget of the U.S. Government, fiscal year 1984, section 3—31.
2. Sources: OECD Economic Outlook, December 1982, Table 9 and Annual
Economic Report, EEC, November 1982.
3. For the argument to be complete, it should show why the government cannot
issue more and more debt forever and therefore has to repudiate the debt.
Dealing with these Issues would lead us too far astray.
4. The maximum inflation tax is relatively small. Unanticipated inflation
may, however, If debt is in the form of long term bonds with nominal
coupons, substantially reduce the real value of the debt.
5. An interesting attempt to estimate OECD fiscal reaction functions in
this light and to study implications for structural deficits is described
in Hubbard [1983].
6. The roots of the system (1), (2) (with equality) are r and —a. The charac-
teristic vector associated with a, (x1, x2) is such that x1/x2 =(r+
Thus D —D=
c1(r+ a)
1e and X —X=c1eat
Taking the ratio gives the equation in the text.
7. Interest payments were equal. to 7.8% of GDP in 1982, and have to be de-
ducted from disbursements to get C.
8. The medium term budgetary objectives, as of fiscal year 1982, for
Belgium, are of a reduction of the general government deficit from 12.8%
in 1982 to 7% in 1985. This is to be achieved partly through a reduction
in spending. (Source: OECD. Public Sector Deficits: Problems and
Policy Implications. Occasional Papers, June 1983). The June 1983
EEC projections of deficits in Belgium are, however, of 11.7% for 1983
and 12.1% for 1984 (Source: European Economy. Supplement A. No. 6.
June 1983, Table 9).—32—
9. Although the model captures the'idea that agents do not have Infinite
horizons, agents in the model do not go through a life cycle. Thus
the model cannot be used to examine issues for which the life cycle is
essential, such as, for example, saving for retirement or social
security.
10. In the absence of actuarial bonds, agents would not only leave
unanticipated bequests but might also go bankrupt. Actuarial bonds
allow agents to insure themselves against such contingencies. Their
presence simplifies the analysis considerably but is in no way the
source of the non—neutrality of deficits or debt.
11. In this section, no notational distinction is made between actual and ex-
pected values. ñforexample is the expected change in H.
12. Tobin [1967] developed a realistic model of life cycle to look at steady
state savings. He did not look however at the effects of debt.
13. The system is in fact recursive.R depends on D, but D does not depend
on R. Consols may actually not be traded at all in the economy. R is
introduced to get a convenient characteristic of the term structure, and
because it will play an important role in the next section.
14. An alternative strategy would have been to imbed the aggregate consumption
function of the previous section in an otherwise Keynesian model. It
would however be slightly more cumbersome analytically.
15. This Is a simplified and modified version of Blanchard [19811. It is very
similar to a ndel developed by Cardoso [19831. It is related to a re-
cent model by Turnovsky and Miller [1982] which treats the government
budget constraint explicitly but maintains the fixed price assumption.—33—
16. In the case where consumption is given by the consumption function
derived in the previous section, and where consumers have static
expectations, we can derive g explicitly. In that case,
C + C —(0+ p) (D + + G . Thus,
g =(0+p)(D — + G .Rearrangingand using the
government budget constraint gives:
•0—r
g(0+p-r)D+D+—-T
Ifr is close to 0, this simplifies to:
g =pD+D
17. (Saddle point) stability of the system does not depend on this assumption.
18. The algebraic derivation of these paths is straightforward but extremely
tedious. The method is identical to that used in appendix B in Blanchard
[1981].
19. This possibility is partially explored in Blanchard [1981] by the introduc-
tion of a stock market which affects aggregate demand.—34—
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